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A common denominator of network neutrality definitions is a plea against traffic 
shaping within the Internet and the resultant challenge to the traditional ‘best 
effort’ transmission. By means of access regulation of local loop bottleneck 
components the transfer of market power from the telecommunications network 
bottleneck components into the complementary Internet access service markets 
can be avoided. Regulation between access service providers and Internet appli-
cation service providers is not justified. The avoidance of network neutrality 
regulation is of importance, because only then can the adequate market signals 
(congestion tariffs, quality differentiations etc.) be supplied to the content pro-
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1.     Introduction 
 
The role of government interventions and regulations has different traditions in 
the media, information technologies (IT) and telecommunications sectors. The 
media industry, for example, has traditionally been viewed as a bearer of social, 
cultural and ethical values within society. As such, the media has historically 
been subjected to federal regulation to some extent, e.g. public broadcasting. 
Federal intervention in private communication in most western, industrialized 
countries, on the other hand, has been largely absent, as it has generally been in 
the computer and IT industry as well. In Europe, the computer and IT industry 
has been allowed to develop in an unregulated manner for the most part under 
the general competition law.  
 
Several authors have raised questions along these lines with regard to the Inter-
net. Mestmäcker (2001), for example, asks whether content will still be subject 
to regulation in the future considering the enormous scope of content production 
and distribution in the converging markets. Fisher (2000) and others wonder 
whether there is still a serious applications barrier to entry in the microprocessor 
market, given the enormous potential for middleware threats due to innovations 
on the browser market. Kesan and Shah (2001) make an attempt to identify the 
potential and the limits to self-regulation in the organization of access to Internet 
Protocol (IP) number assignments and domain name systems, while Müller and 
Rannenberg (1999) question the safety of the Internet. These highly relevant and 
pertinent questions, however, will not be addressed here, because the focus of 
this paper is on the issue of broadband convergence and quality of service dif-
ferentiation of Internet data transport.  
 
 
2.    Broadband convergence and quality of service differentiation 
 
2.1   The role of telecommunications for Internet Traffic 
 
The provision of Internet data transport requires Internet access services as well 
as Internet backbone services. Both Internet traffic services are based on tele-  2
communications capacities, combined with Internet logistics. Telecommunica-
tions capacities are produced by local telecommunications infrastructure and 
long-distance telecommunications infrastructure. Complementary to Internet 
traffic services several application services are provided. Internet application 
service providers offer their customers a wide spectrum of different services by 
combining both peripheral and main elements (see Figure 1). 
 
 












































Source: Knieps, Zenhäusern (2008, p. 122) 
 
Terminal equipment (e.g. PCs and cellular phones) can be used either with or 
without access to the Internet, although obviously the use of the Internet is not 
possible without any terminal equipment. Content may be provided via the 
Internet (e.g. video on demand, customized music and video libraries), but it is 
also available through other distribution channels, such as cinemas, traditional 
video libraries and traditional broadcasting. Internet service provision would be 
possible without any sort of content provision (e.g. Knieps, 2003, pp. 217 ff.).  
 
   3
2.2   Quality of service (QoS) and the development of the smart Internet 
 
In its origins, the Internet was based on narrowband local telecommunications 
infrastructure, and thus was basically a transport medium for e-mails. At that 
time the Internet was relatively new to market players, and terminal equipment 
as well as content was not primarily designed for interacting with the Internet. 
Telecommunications networks originally were not constructed for Internet pur-
poses either. Network Internet intelligence was basically located at the edges, 
not at the core of the Internet. The task of the routers was to simply forward data 
packages, without differentiation between services or applications. Within the 
Internet, all traffic was treated equally, meaning non-discriminatorily, between 
different services and customers. The traffic principle was “first in, first out”. 
Thus, the traditional IPv4 Internet is characterised by best-effort homogeneous 
transportation quality. All data packets are forwarded by the routers with the 
same priority. No quality differentiation of packets transport does exist. 
 
Convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sec-
tors has been increasing in recent years with the emergence of the Internet and 
with the increasing capability of existing networks to carry both telecommunica-
tions and broadcasting services. Developments in digital technologies and soft-
ware are creating large innovative technological potential for the production, 
distribution and consumption of information services. Convergence, character-
ised as the ability of different network platforms to carry essentially similar 
kinds of services, may have different faces: telecommunications operators may 
offer audio-visual programming over their network, broadcasters may provide 
data services over their networks, cable operators may provide a range of tele-
communication services.  
 
The Internet as the prime driver of convergence is displacing traditional isolated 
computer networks, it is providing an alternative means of offering telecommu-
nication services (e.g. Internet telephony), and, moreover, the Internet is also 
becoming a significant platform for broadcasting services. In addition, techno-
logical convergence makes possible innovative services which combine product 
characteristics from the traditionally distinct branches of telecommunications, IT   4
and the media, thereby enlarging the scope of voice, data, multimedia and audio-
visual services. 
 
The best effort routing of the traditional Internet, by means of the Transmission 
Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP / IP), is challenged by the emergence 
of heterogeneous applications services, like Internet telephony, interactive video 
gaming, large volume music exchange services etc. Consequently, traffic quality 
differentiation addressing delay, delay variation (jitter), and packet loss becomes 
increasingly important. Whereas interactive applications are very delay and jitter 
sensitive, e-mail services or the download of documents is typically less delay 
sensitive.  
 
Within the differentiated services (Diff Serv/DS) concept of QoS differentiation 
traffic classification as well as traffic conditioning is of importance. Within traf-
fic classification data packets are classified into ex ante defined number of 
classes without the use of any end to end signalling protocols. All data packets 
within the premium class are transported more rapid and more reliable than the 
data packets of lower classes. Quality classes are monotone with respect to 
transport quality (e.g. Jin, Jordan, 2005, p. 842). “Intelligent” routers have the 
task of packet classification and conditioning according to defined QoS classes. 
Within Diff Serv a hierarchy of routers is implemented. Only access routers re-
spectively edge routers classify the packets and condition the traffic. The routers 
within the Internet backbone (core routers) only deal with aggregation of traffic 
to perform scheduling and buffer management (e.g. Liakopoulos et al., 2004; 
Chen, Zhang, 2004, pp. 371 ff.).  
 
 
3.    Telecommunications regulation and the net neutrality debate    
 
3.1   The net neutrality debate in Germany and Europe  
 
Relating to the notion of network neutrality, it “has been used to describe a data 
network that assigns all transmissions equal priority as they are passed along the 
network” (OECD, 2006, p. 3). In this respect it is a “call for regulatory limita-  5
tions on network owners’ ability to discriminate against particular content,   
applications, and devices” (Yoo, 2006, p.1850). A common denominator of   
network neutrality definitions is a plea against traffic shaping within the Internet 
and the resultant challenge to the traditional ‘best effort’ transmission (e.g. 
Knieps, Vogelsang, 2007, pp.105 ff.). 
 
The role of market power in future Internet traffic organisation is considered to 
be of significant relevance. Internet application providers (e.g. Google, Yahoo 
etc.) have worried that in the absence of network neutrality they might face 
higher prices or degraded services (e.g. Hogendorn, 2007). The focus of the de-
bate is on whether Internet application providers should be protected from the 
abuse of market power of Internet access providers (e.g. Economides, 2007,   
p. 8). Therefore, the network neutrality debate centres on private and social   
incentives for traffic shaping and the impact of the supposed market power   
involved. This may include the statutory prohibition of blockage of content or 
applications (“port blocking”), meaning that Internet access service providers 
can deny customers access even to lawful content. Furthermore net neutrality 
regulation may include agreements between the providers of Internet access   
services and providers of Internet application services (e. g. Internet content de-
livery services) taking into account different traffic qualities and congestion 
management, as well as vertical integration of Internet access service providers 
into the production of Internet content or other application services (e.g. Knieps, 
Zenhäusern, 2008, p. 120).  
 
 
3.2   Regulatory arrangements for communication services 
 
Despite the fact that the telecommunications sector is fully liberalized in   
Germany – as well as in all other European countries – it is still characterized by 
a complex set of sector-specific regulations today. 
 
The basic goal of the 1999 Review of the European Commission (European 
Commission 1998) was to consider the extent to which phasing out sector-
specific market power regulation should take place. The key objectives stated at   6
the beginning of the review process were: (1) to maximize the application of the 
general European competition law; (2) to minimize sector-specific regulation; 
and (3) to rigorously phase out unnecessary regulation (European Commission 
1998, p. 3). 
 
On 12 July 2000, the European Commission presented its ‘1999 Review Pack-
age’, which included five proposals for Directives of the European Parliament 
and the Council, and one proposal for a Regulation. Since then, the following 
directives have been enacted: an ONP Framework Directive,
1 an Access and In-
terconnection Directive,
2 a Licensing Directive,
3 a Universal Service Directive,
4 
a Personal Data/Protection of Privacy Directive.
5 In addition, the proposal for 
the regulation of unbundled access to the local loop was passed by the European 
Parliament and the Council, and enacted in January 2001.
6 This regulation 
marks a first for the EU, as the legal instrument of a regulation has never been 
used before in telecommunications policy. In contrast to a Directive, which re-
quires national legislative enactment measures, a Regulation is the most power-
                                                 
1   Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities 
L108/33, 24 April 2002. 
2   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities L108/7, 24 April 
2002. 
3  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the authorization of electronic communications networks and services (Au-
thorization Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities L108/21, 24 
April 2002. 
4  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services (Universal Service Directive), Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities  L108/51, 24 April 2002. 
5   Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the elec-
tronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), 
Official Journal of the European Communities  L201/37, 31 July 2002. 
6   Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities L336/4, 30 December 2000.   7
ful legislative tool made available by the EC Treaty. It is binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States, meaning that it automatically be-
comes law in all Member States as soon as it is enacted.
7
 
According to this regulation, the incumbent operator with significant market 
power is obliged to provide full, unbundled access, as well as shared access, to 
the copper local loop under transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions. 
The implementation of price regulation is left to the national regulatory authori-
ties. As long as the level of competition for local access is insufficient to prevent 
excessive pricing, national regulatory authorities are required to ensure that the 
principle of cost orientation is applied. 
 
Both the Framework Directive and the Access Directive provide no clear-cut 
definition of future sector-specific regulation. The Framework Directive pro-
vides a new interpretation of the criterion ‘considerable market power’, moving 
in the direction of establishing the criterion of dominance in a given market as a 
prerequisite for sector-specific market power regulation. It gives the Commis-
sion discretionary power to identify a variety of markets for which the introduc-
tion of sector-specific regulatory measures should at least be considered. The 
Access Directive already indicates that sector-specific regulation may be ex-
tended to competitive markets (e.g. mobile telephony) as well as newly develop-
ing innovative markets (e.g. the Internet).
8  
 
In Germany, the telecommunications law of 25 July 1996 has allowed global 
market entry since January 1998.
9 The EU review process spurred on a review 
of the national communications law in Germany, which was finally revised in 
June 2004.
10 The question thus arises as to whether additional sector-specific 
                                                 
7  This does not rule out the fact that directives may have direct effect in Member 
States,  provided that the provisions of the directive are sufficiently precise and un-
conditional. 
8   Legislative reform proposals to amend the regulatory framework covers changes to 
the Universal Service Directive (COM (2007) 698 final), as well as reform proposals 
to the Framework and Access Directives (COM (2007) 697). 
9   Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) vom 25. Juli 1996 (BGBl. I S.1120)  
10  Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) vom 22. Juni 2004, (BGBl. I S. 1190)    8




3.3     The disaggregated regulatory approach 
 
Criteria such as relative market share, financial strength and access to input and 
service markets can only serve as a starting point for evaluating the existence of 
market power. ‘Criteria for conjecturing a dominant position’ (“Vermutungs-
kriterien”) on the basis of market shares, for example, can lead to economically 
unjustified criteria for government intervention in network industries. From a 
competition economics point of view, the use of ex ante, sector-specific regula-
tory intervention constitutes massive interference with the market process and 
thus always requires a particularly well-founded justification based on modern 
network economics.
11 Obviously, the development of an ex ante regulatory crite-
rion creates a need for a more clear-cut definition of market power. 
 
It is necessary to differentiate between those areas in which active and potential 
competition can work and other areas, so-called monopolistic bottleneck areas. 
The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks is based on a strict application of 
Stigler’s concept of barriers to entry in order to identify network-specific market 
power. Stigler’s concept of entry barriers, which focuses on long-term cost 
asymmetries between incumbent and potential entrants, is essential here to   
identify a proper regulatory basis (Stigler, 1968, p. 67). The conditions for a 
monopolistic bottleneck facility are fulfilled if the facility is necessary for reach-
                                                 
11  The traditional methods and approaches in general competition law, both with re-
spect to merger control and the control of abusive practices, are fundamentally dif-
ferent from those of sector-specific, regulatory economics. Any mingling of these 
two different approaches is misleading. The paper examines the question of a sector-
specific need for regulation and thus does not comment on merger cases. Market 
shares and turnover are easily measurable and are therefore usually taken up as crite-
ria in competition law. However, they must not in any way be confused with a sound 
economic analysis of the effectiveness of active and potential competition. When ex-
amining a merger case, the competition authorities use a large number of criteria to 
which they attach, by their own discretion, a varying degree of significance on a 
case-by-case basis. For the general control of abusive practices, as well, competition 
law envisions a correction of market processes on a case-by-case basis.    9
ing consumers, that is, if no second or third such facility exists, i.e. if there is no 
active substitute available. This is the case if there is, due to economies of scale 
and economies of scope, a natural monopoly situation, so that one supplier can 
provide this facility at a lesser cost than several suppliers. And furthermore, if at 
the same time the facility cannot be duplicated in an economically feasible way, 
that is, if no potential substitute is available. This is the case if the costs of the 
facility are irreversible (c.f. Knieps, 1997).  
 
Thus, the regulation of network-specific market power is only justified in mo-
nopolistic bottleneck areas. In all other cases, the existence of active and poten-
tial competition will lead to efficient market results as in the other sectors of an 
economy. The role of competition is by no means confined to potential competi-
tion. Both active and potential competition with technological differentiation as 
well as product differentiation and innovation (of both products and processes) 
constitute potential parameters of effective competition. Service networks due to 
the absence of irreversible costs unquestionably have non-bottleneck character; 
they may or may not possess the characteristics of a natural monopoly. When 
establishing proof that a facility is a monopolistic bottleneck, it is crucial to con-
centrate exclusively on those network areas where there is a lack of active as 
well as potential competition and, consequently, no economically feasible alter-
native network access on the downstream markets. For instance, if a service 
network provider can choose between alternative network infrastructure provid-
ers, there is no monopolistic bottleneck, even if the infrastructures in question 
are not identical but, in accordance with the theory of monopolistic competition, 
characterised by product/technology differentiation (Knieps, 2006, pp. 53 ff.). 
 
 
4.    Lessons for the net neutrality debate 
 
The transport of data packages belongs to the markets for Internet transport ser-
vices. Due to the absence of irreversible cost providing Internet logistic, they do 
not possess the characteristics of monopolistic bottlenecks. However, Internet 
traffic services are based on telecommunications capacities. Insofar as the mar-
kets for telecommunications capacities have monopolistic bottleneck compo-  10
nents, regulation may be necessary to guarantee competitive markets for traffic 
services.  
 
Since the markets for long-distance telecommunications infrastructure capacities 
are competitive, the markets for Internet backbone services also are competitive. 
However, local telecommunications infrastructure capacities may possess the 
characteristics of monopolistic bottlenecks for which neither active nor potential 
substitutes are available. The EU regulation on unbundled access to the local 
loop proceeded from this assumption and concluded that there is still a need to 
regulate an incumbent operator’s local access network. 
 
In Germany increasing competition within local telecommunications infrastruc-
tures (local loops) can be observed. Competition has led to considerable variety 
in technological platforms, e.g. optical fiber, wireless networks, Community   
Antenna Television (CATV) networks and satellite technology, as well as to an 
increase in product variety. In addition, because of these rapid developments, the 
local loop facilities in larger cities and agglomerations in Germany are increas-
ingly losing their status as monopolistic bottlenecks. Although it is not possible 
at this point to predict exactly how long it will take for the monopolistic bottle-
necks in the local loop to disappear completely, it is clear that the building of 
access networks parallel to monopolistic bottlenecks, which was until only re-
cently considered a futuristic dream, is now in full swing. The development of 
alternative access networks indicates that the potential for phasing out sector-
specific regulation in telecommunications is strongly increasing (e.g. Blankart, 
Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007). 
 
To the extent that local networks constitute monopolistic bottlenecks, ex ante 
regulation appears justified. Since unregulated tariffs would enable owners of 
monopolistic bottlenecks to generate excessive profits, the instrument of price-
cap regulation should be introduced. It is important to restrict such price-cap 
regulation to those areas of telecommunications networks where market power 
due to monopolistic bottlenecks is a regulatory problem. In all other subparts of 
telecommunications networks, price setting should be left to competitive market 
forces.   11
By means of access regulation of local loop bottleneck components the transfer 
of market power from the telecommunications network bottleneck components 
into the complementary Internet access service markets can be avoided. Regula-
tion between access service providers and Internet application service providers 
is not justified. The avoidance of network neutrality regulation is of importance, 
because only then can the adequate market signals (congestion tariffs, quality  
differentiations etc.) be supplied to the content provider, leading to a more effi-
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